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According to Buchanan and Congleton (1998), the generality principle in politics blocks 
special interests. Consequently, the generality principle should thereby promote eco-
nomic efficiency. This study tests this hypothesis on wage formation and labor markets, 
by investigating whether generality defined as state neutrality could explain employ-
ment performance among OECD countries during 1970-2003. We identify three types 
of non-neutrality as concerns unemployment: the level or degree of government inter-
ference in the wage bargaining process over and above legislation which facilitate mu-
tually beneficial wage agreements, the constrained bargaining range (meaning the extent 
to which the state favors or blocks certain outcomes of the bargaining process), and the 
cost shifting (which relates to state interference shifting the direct or indirect burden of 
costs facing the parties on the labor market). Our overall hypothesis is that non-
neutrality or non-generality increases unemployment rates. The empirical results from 
the general conditional model suggest that government intervention and a constrained 
bargaining range clearly increase unemployment, while a few of the cost shifting vari-
ables have unexpected effects. The findings thus give some, but not unqualified, support 
for the generality principle as a method to promote economic efficiency.  
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1. Introduction  
 
Buchanan and Congleton (1998) advocate the introduction of a generality principle in 
political decision-making.
1 Through such a principle, they argue, legislation will “apply 
to all persons independently of membership to in a dominant coalition or an effective 
interest group”. In other words, generality will promote impartiality and state neutrality. 
Presumably this will also promote economic efficiency since the enforcement of the 
generality principle will both block wasteful rent-seeking activities and harmful inter-
ventions into markets and civil society.
2 
 
In this study we test this hypothesis on wage formation and labor markets, by investigat-
ing whether generality defined as state neutrality could explain employment perform-
ance among OECD countries during 1970-2003. To our knowledge such an empirical 
test of the economic consequences of the generality principle or state neutrality has not 
been done before.  
 
We identify three, partly overlapping, types of non-neutrality as concerns unemploy-
ment. These include the level or degree of government interference in the wage bargain-
ing process over and above legislation which facilitate mutually beneficial wage agree-
ments, the constrained bargaining range (meaning the extent to which the state favors or 
blocks certain outcomes of the bargaining process), and the cost shifting (which relates 
to state interference shifting the direct or indirect burden of costs facing the parties on 
the labor market).  
 
To test the effects of the enforcement of the generality principle on wage formation and 
labor markets may perhaps be particularly interesting, since much of the literature and 
standard textbooks in labor economics almost as a postulate regard all labor markets to 
be in need of regulations that favor the sellers of labor and their organizations, i.e. 
workers and labor unions. Hence, according to this literature the state should not be 
                                                 
1 See also Buchanan (1993a; 1993b) and Congelton (1997). 
2 In the case of fiscal policies Berggren (2000), however, argues that the generality principle should be 
augmented with a requirement that “public expenditures as a share of GDP may not increase above the 
average share of the preceding ten years” in order to minimize the risk of fiscal explosion.   3 
neutral on the market if economic efficiency and employment should be promoted (e.g. 
Kaufman and Hotchkiss, 2002). In most, at least in the European, OECD countries this 
turns also out to be the actual practice.  
 
In contrast, our overall hypothesis is thus that non-generality or non-neutrality increases 
unemployment rates. To our knowledge such an investigation of a negative relationship 
between state neutrality and level of unemployment has not been conducted systemati-
cally before.  
 
We will start by discussing the generality principle, state neutrality and labor market 
policies in more details in section 2. The data is described in Section 3. The empirical 
model is formulated in Section 4 and the results are presented in Section 5. The sum-
mary of our findings is discussed in Section 6. 
 
2. Generality, State Neutrality, Interventionism and Labor Market 
Policies 
 
In essence, the generality principle stipulates that the state should be impartial or neu-
tral. According to Buchanan and Congleton (1998) legitimate state action should not 
discriminate for or against any person or group. With generality the state would treat all 
citizens equally.  
 
It should be noted, however, that the generality principle or state neutrality does not 
imply non-interventionism or limited government per se.
3 Their argument “is about the 
constitutional structure of those sectors of social interaction that are politicized; it is not 
directly about drawing some borderline between these (public) sectors and the private 
(market) sectors” (p. 147) The point is rather that government action which adheres to 
the generality principle will be efficient since it discourages the natural tendency of ma-
joritarian democracies to give incentives to special interest to engage in rent-seeking 
                                                 
3 As in a competing interpretation of state neutrality which states that the that the state should not 
interfere in the private spheres of individuals. See Trachtenberg (2001) for a more phlilosophical critique 
of the Buchanan-Congelton perspective.   4 
activities. Moreover, they believe that this would also promote the efficiency of the 
policies adopted and, by implication, economic efficiency in general. (p. 15)  
 
In this study we test this hypothesis on wage formation and labor markets, by investigat-
ing whether generality defined as state neutrality could explain employment perform-
ance among OECD countries during 1970-2003. The term “state neutrality” is em-
ployed in the study as impartiality of the state in labor market related issues. A neutral 
state does not in policy formation or in legislation one-sidedly favor, or support, one 
party. Furthermore, according to our interpretation, the government should also refrain 
from intervening – directly or indirectly – in the wage bargaining process. This means 
that general or neutral legislation primarily would facilitate for employers and employ-
ees, unions and employers associations, to come to mutually beneficial wage agree-
ments, regardless of the outcomes of those agreements.  
 
Perhaps a bit surprisingly to most readers, such a view on state neutrality has in fact 
been a core idea in the Nordic labor market model for more than hundred years. Already 
in 1898 the major players on the Danish labor market, both unions and employers or-
ganizations, made an over-arching agreement for how to deal with industrial disputes, 
bargaining, wage setting etc, without state involvement. Sweden followed in 1906, and 
later in 1938, with similar agreements. Both Norway and, perhaps to a lesser extent, 
Finland followed in their steps. (Nycander, 2000; 2002) 
 
Event though there may have been shorter or longer periods of state partisanship, this 
ideology of state neutrality is still a living tradition in all of these countries, shared not 
only by the parties on the labor market themselves but also by practically all political 
parties across the political spectrum. For example, in 1999 the social democratic minis-
ter of labor market relations Mona Sahlin, presently the leader of the party, clearly 




                                                 
4 Swedish Government, Regeringens proposition 1999/2000:32   5 
This is a stark contrast to the practice in both the Continental and the South-European 
countries, but interestingly enough a similarity to the Anglo-Saxon models. In the latter 
case, however, individual contracts instead of collective agreements dominate (see e.g. 
Bamber, Lansbury and Wailes, 2004; Freyssinet and Seifert, 2001; Slomp, 1998). 
 
There are at least four distinct reasons why such a contractual system may be advanta-
geous compared to a more regulated system: 
 
Firstly, it provides opportunities to flexibly adapt wages and benefits to the varying 
conditions occurring in different companies, sectors, branches and regions of the econ-
omy. Secondly, a contractual system thus promotes pluralism and experimentation, 
which in turn encourage learning and efficiency. If and when new and better ways of 
organizing various activities or wage setting occur these may easily spread to other parts 
of the economy. Thirdly, state neutrality gives the actors or partners on the labor market 
full responsibility for their own agreements, whether good or bad, without accommodat-
ing actions from the state. Fourthly, state neutrality, as argued by Buchanan and Con-
gleton, blocks special interests and rent-seeking activities by labor unions and employ-
ers organizations. All in all, such a system may work more like competitive markets in 
general where supply and demand, experimentation and innovation, and voluntary con-
tracts provide price signals for the efficient allocation of resources, including labor 
(Hayek, 1945; 1978; 1980).  
 
Taken together is thus our hypothesis that state neutrality will be beneficial to effi-
ciency, the creation of new jobs and employment. We will test the hypothesis by study-
ing the effects of the three types of non-neutrality identified above.  
 
Below we develop a model in which these three main factors, or categories, are believed 
to affect unemployment. These factors are measured by indicators derived from earlier 
research. The first main category concerns direct Government involvement in the labor 
market over and above legislation which facilitate for unions and employers associa-
tions, employers and employees, to come to mutually beneficial wage agreements. Two 
variables are included in this category.  The first, Government involvement in the wage   6 
bargaining process (Government involvement index) has often been analyzed in relation 
to wage inequalities and been used as a wage-setting measure in earlier research. How-
ever, it this measure has not been specifically employed to analyze state neutrality. The 
variable is measured as a time-varying index (1-15) that measures increasing govern-
ment involvement. For instance, 1 (one) implies that the state is completely uninvolved 
in the wage bargaining process, whereas increases of the index imply increasing gov-
ernment involvement, such as government extension of collective agreements, enforce-
ment of cost of living adjustment, national wage schedules etc (see Appendix 1).  Some 
but perhaps not all of these indicate non-neutrality. 
 
The second variable in this category measures if there exists a minimum wage law in a 
specific country and in a certain year, which clearly is a breach of state neutrality. This 
is a dummy variable that can vary over time (0,1), and which measures only the pres-
ence a state-imposed law that sets the wages at a minimum level. Thus, it does not 
measure the very level or ratio of minimum wages over time or across countries. Some 
countries, such as Sweden or the other Nordic countries, do not apply minimum wage 
laws, while this is common in e.g. Mediterranean countries (FedEE, 2005). 
 
The second category, Constrained bargaining range, meaning the extent to which the 
state favors or blocks certain outcomes of the bargaining process, is in the present arti-
cle represented by one single indicator, namely Employment protection. The variable 
captures the strictness of employment protection laws on a scale 0-2, with increasing 
strictness. Employment protection often takes several forms but includes e.g. limitations 
of dismissals, or employer’s freedom to assign tasks etc. to employees. (Nickell et al., 
2005). However, it is in many instances hard to separate state-imposed employment 
protection regulated by law, from those various agreements and measures of employ-
ment security that often are negotiated or regulated in collective agreements. More spe-
cifically, even though the employment protection variable is used as an indicator of in-
creasing difficulty for an employer to dismiss an employee, any general employment 
protection indicator should probably be taken as a more or less a compact acronym for 
protection regulated in legislation as well as in collective agreements or customary prac-
tice etc. Thus, even if the variable in this particular circumstance is used as an indicator   7 
of non-neutrality – i.e. constrained bargaining range – it is acknowledged by the authors 
that the variable in many instances actually may measure agreements that de facto are 
negotiated without any government-imposed bargaining range. Still, it is quite clear that 
such “voluntary” nation-wide agreements about employment protection would not have 
occurred without supporting legislation of other kinds. 
5  
 
The last category Cost shifting relates to non-neutral state interference shifting the direct 
or indirect burden of costs facing the parties on the labor market, between the parties or 
perhaps to a third party such as the state itself. Here, five related variables are employed 
to indicate the degree of cost shifting. Firstly, Unemployment qualifying condition 
measures the time needed to qualify for benefit. The longer the time to qualify, the more 
of the cost associated with unemployment is carried by the individual and not by an-
other or third party. Similarly, the variable Unemployment benefit duration is an indica-
tor of how long an unemployed person is entitled for unemployment benefit. As with 
the first variable, this naturally varies strongly across economies and over time. The 
longer the benefit duration, it is thought, the more of the costs for unemployment is car-
ried by for instance a third party such as the state. A third and closely related variable, 
Unemployment benefit waiting, measures the time a person must wait to start receiving 
benefit after becoming unemployed. This variable would indicate the longer the waiting 
period for benefit after becoming unemployed, the lower the cost for another or third 
party.  
 
Two more variables are included in the non-neutral category of cost shifting and they 
refer more to the overall or general generosity in the social security system, Unemploy-
ment and Sickness benefit generosity, respectively. Both variables represent measures 
that take in several dimensions over the generosity of unemployment or sickness bene-
fits, and they include benefit levels as well as the ratio of the working force actually 
insured in the system(s). It should be noted that both of these generosity indicators are 
                                                 
5 For a discussion, see OECD Employment Outlook (1999). As also discussed by e.g. Buchele and 
Christiansen (1999), this measure is complicated and lacks some detail since it does not necessarily take 
into account the full force of restrictions on employers since much protection is negotiated in collective 
agreements rather than by government regulations.   8 
not necessarily correlated – a high score on the unemployment generosity variable does 





The data used in this study cover 18 OECD countries observed for the period 1970-
2003. Countries included are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany (West Germany), Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States. The variables in 
the analysis relate to institutional and regulatory factors, as well as to welfare and eco-
nomic incentive variables. The data is derived from previous research and assembled 
from different databases (for more detailed information, see Appendix 1).  
 
Labor market and related variables are derived from Golden et al. (2002), “Union Cen-
tralization among Advanced Industrial Societies: An Empirical Study”. This dataset 
along with earlier versions has been previously used in analyzing e.g. determinants of 
wage inequalities; see Wallerstein (1999), Golden and Londrean (2006), and Golden 
and Wallerstein (2006). The Labour Market Institutions Dataset from Stephen Nickell 
and Luca Nunziata (2001) has been employed earlier for studying unemployment and 
wages in the OECD (see for instance Nickell et al., 2001). More general welfare indica-
tors in the analysis are from Huber et al. (2004), Comparative Welfare States Data Set. 
Moller et al. (2003) e.g. used this data in studying determinants of relative poverty. Fi-
nally, Scruggs’ (2005) data, “Welfare States Entitlement Data Set: A Comparative Insti-
tutional Analysis of Eighteen Welfare States”, contains, among other things, compre-
hensive data over qualifying conditions, benefits durations and generosity measures. It 
has among other things previously been used by Scruggs and Allan (2004) in analyzing 
welfare state reform in advanced economies. Additionally, empirical data that measures 
                                                 
6 For a detailed description, see Scruggs and Allan (2006). Since the different indicators differ even 
within the one and the same economy, it is hard to find a national coherent strategy for welfare in an 
overall sense, with exceptions of the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands; Scruggs och Allan, 
2006, p. 69. 
    9 
self-employment in OECD countries has also been used (Van Stel, 2003). Table 1 pre-
sents summary statistics over the variables in the analysis. 
 
The model structure is shown in Table 1 where the dependent variable is the rate of un-
employment (UE) measured in percentage of the workforce. The independent variables 
are classified into 4 groups: (i) government involvement, (ii) constrained bargaining, 
(iii) cost shifting, and (iv) economic and country specific variables.  
 
The government involvement category includes two variables: government involvement 
(GOVIN) and minimum wage law (MWLAW). Both the variables are binary variable 
where the value 1 indicated government involvement in wage setting and presence of 
minimum wage law in the country. The second category contains only one variable; 
constrained bargaining range (EP) is defined as three scale degree of employment pro-
tection.  
 
The third category, cost shifting, contains 5 indicators including: unemployment quali-
fying (UEQUAL) condition defined as number of days worked before qualifying for the 
receipt of such benefit, unemployment duration (UEDUR) defined as the maximum 
duration of unemployment benefit, unemployment waiting time (UEWAIT) defined as 
the number of days of unemployment before a payment is made, unemployment benefit 
(UEMLOY), and sickness benefit (SICKNESS) generosity are indices where a higher 
value indicate a higher generosity of the system with respect to the respective type of 
benefit payments.  
 
The last category labeled as control variables are observable economic, time and coun-
try specific variables or conditional variables including: a time trend (T) capturing time 
varying technology and policy effects, industrialization (INDUST) defined as the share 
of labor force employment in industries, total business ownership rate (TOTRATE) de-
fined in percentage rate, investment rate (KI) defined as percentage of real GDP per 
employee, gross fixed capital (GROSSK) defined in national currencies, and finally two 
binary variables indicating location or groups of countries and labor market models of 
Scandinavian (SCAND) and West European (WESTE), respectively.     10 
 
Table 1. The model structure. 
A. Dependent variable: 
 
B. Independent Variables: 





  MWLAW 
II. Constrained bargaining range  EP 
III. Cost shifting  UEQUAL 
  UEDUR 
  UEWAIT 
  UEMPLOY 
  SICKNESS 
C. Control variables: 






  TOTRATE 
  KI 
  GROSSK 
  SCAND 
  WESTE 
 
The summary statistics of the data is presented in Table 2. The data is an unbalanced 
panel data and have a maximum number of 997 observations. The differences in the 
number of observations (N) by included variables indicates presence of significant num-
ber of missing unit data points. In particular data is not available for several East Euro-
pean countries in the 70s and beginning of 80s. We kept the missing observations in the 
data prior to the estimation to have a better picture of the distribution of each of the la-
bor market indicators.  
 
The mean sample unemployment rate is 6.1% (3.9%) and it varies in the interval of 0 
and 24.5% of the labor force.  The number in parenthesis is the standard deviation. The 
minimum value of 0% unemployment rate indicates measurement error. The share of 
countries with minimum wage law is only 27.8%. The constrained bargaining rate var-
ies in the interval 0.10 and 2.0 with sample mean 1.09 (0.56). 
 
The cost shifting variables show in general more variations. The mean number of days 
worked prior to being qualified for receiving unemployment benefit is 51.6 (46.6) days.   11 
It varies in the range of 0 days and 208 days. The dispersion in unemployment benefit 
duration is much higher. The mean sample is 211.5 (342.4) days. It varies in the interval 
18 and 999 days. The upper level seems indicate unlimited length of duration. The aver-
age number of waiting days before receiving unemployment benefit is 4.8 (4.8) days 
and it varies between 0 and 18 days. Similarly we observe significant variations in the 
generosity of both unemployment and sickness benefit systems among the sample coun-
tries. The means (std deviations) are 7.39 (2.72) and 8.38 (3.90) respectively.  
 
The time trend variable shows that the countries are on the average observed 18 years 
and each between 1 and 34 years. The low frequency of observation is attributed to the 
East European countries. On the average 29.5% (6.3%) of the workforce is employed in 
the industries. The share varies in the interval 9.9% and 48.4% indicating large differ-
ence in degree of industrialization. The mean total business ownership rate is 14.8% 
(5.9%) and varies in the range of 6.3% and 28.4%. The investment rate as percentage of 
real GDP per employee is 23.9% with a relatively small dispersion (4.5%), although the 
range is in the interval 13.4% and 41.0%. A total of 21.7% of the sample data is from 
Scandinavian countries. The corresponding for West European and other countries are 
49.4% and 28.9%, respectively 
   12 
Table 2. Summary statistics. 
Variable  Definition     N        Mean                Std Dev     Minimum    Maximum 
Year  Year of observation  997  1987  9.8406      1970  2003 
UE        Unemployment rate  620  6.128      3.867         0.003     20.151  
GOVIN  Government involvement index       493  5.834      3.635    1  15 
MWLAW  Min wage law=1                558  0.278      0.448    0   1.000  
EP  Employment protection             575    1.092      0.565    0.100      2.000  
UEQUAL  Unemployment  qualifying  condi-
tion  
574  51.563     46.595        0    208.000  
UEDUR  Unempl benefit duration       574  211.465    342.395       18.000    999.000  
UEWAIT  Unempl benefit waiting        575    4.774      4.845         0     18.000  
UEMPLOY  Unempl generosity             576       7.386      2.716         1.016     12.974  
SICKNESS  Sickness generosity              574  8.384      3.901         0     15.657  
T  Trend  740  18.329      9.715        1.000     34.000 
INDUST  Labor force in industry (%)  558  0.295      0.063    0.099      0.484 
TOTRATE  Total Bus Own rate             736     0.148      0.059    0.063      0.384  
KI  Investment % of RGDPL         558  23.877      4.536        13.441     41.022  
GROSSK  Gross fixed capital            558       54203  23868065   488.000   149020400 
SCAND  Scandinavia  740       0.217      0.413    0   1.000 
WESTE  Western Europe  740  0.494      0.500    0  1.000 
 
5. Empirical Model 
 
The article’s aim is to analyze the effects of state neutrality and intervention in the labor 
market, more specifically its effects on unemployment in OECD. The unemployment 
model is specified as function of the determinants of unemployment with reference to 
state neutrality and economic and country specific variables as follows: 
 
(1)      
it mit m m
k kit k it it it it
u ECSV
COSTSHIFT EP MWLAW GOVINT UE
+ ∑ +
∑ + + + + =
δ
γ β α α α 2 1 0  
 
where UE is the rate of unemployment for country i in period t, GOVINT and 
MWLAW are indicators of government intervention in form of involvement in wage 
formation and introduction of minimum wage law, EP is constrained bargaining, COST-
SHIFT is a vector of variables capturing cost shifting from employees to employers, 
ECSV is a vector of economic and country specific variables capturing heterogeneity in 
labor market conditions, and the u capture unobservable effects, effects of left out vari-  13 
ables and measurement error in the unemployment rate. The  γ δ β α , , , are unknown 
parameters to be estimated which capture the effects of state intervention, constrained 
bargaining, cost shifting and conditioning economic and welfare variables. Thus, the 
impacts of government involvement, constrained bargaining and cost shifting effects are 
analyzed conditioning on the economic and country heterogeneity. By controlling for 
these conditional variables we reduce the size of unobservable effects and also avoid 
biased estimated effects of the first categories or determinants of interventions on the 
rate of unemployment.  
 
6. Empirical Results 
 
Five models are specified and estimated by ordinary least squares method. We have 
controlled for the time and country effects in the specification of the models. The em-
pirical results are presented Table 3. Some of the 5 models are nested in respect with 
their specification. Models 1-4 are restricted and unconditional versions of the general 
Model 5. They are unconditional in the sense that the effect of each category is analyzed 
by ignoring the effects of remaining categories of variables. In general, the choice of 
appropriate model could be based on Chow test using the residual sum of square or R
2 
from the 5 models. However, due to the missing unit observations the 5 models despite 
being related differ in the number of observations and thereby not possible to test them 
against the general model. The four restricted models (Model 1 to 4) are not nested and 
interpreted individually with respect to the variable categories contribution to the expla-
nation of the variations in the rate of unemployment and fit of the models. We find the 
general Model 5 as the appropriate model specification and use the remaining 4 models 
to quantify the contribution of each variable category reflected in the differences in the 
models R
2 levels. In all models we control for the labor market model (Scandinavian, 
West European, and Other country groups). In all models the ‘Other’ country group 
serves as the reference country group.   
 
The first model includes the first kind of non-neutrality Government involvement and 
analyzes the effect direct government involvement (GOVIN) in the wage bargaining 
process as well as the effects of minimum wage laws (MWLAW). As can be observed,   14 
GOVIN shows a negative and statistically insignificant effect on unemployment. 
MWLAW, on the other hand, displays a positive and significant effect: countries with 
minimum wage laws display higher unemployment on average. The countries with 
minimum wage have on the average 0.84% higher unemployment rate than those with-
out. The West European group does not differ from the ‘Other’ countries group, but the 
Scandinavian labor market model is found to be superior and it shows lower average (-
1.8%) unemployment rate compared with the reference group ‘Other’ countries. 
 
As mentioned earlier, Model 2 includes one variable, Employment protection, which 
represents the second kind of non-neutrality, Constrained bargaining range. The em-
ployment protection variable shows as expected a negative but insignificant effect on 
unemployment. It is statistically significant only at the 13 percent level. Consequently, 
this model – or category – alone cannot explain variations in the rate of unemployment. 
In this model both of the West European and Scandinavian groups differ statistically 
from the ‘Other’ countries group. The Scandinavian labor market model is found on the 
average to have 1.3% lower unemployment than the ‘Other’ country group, while the 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)  16 
 
Model 3, furthermore, represents the third category of non-neutrality Cost shifting. 
Here, three out of five variables show statistically significant effects on unemployment. 
Unemployment qualification (UEQUAL) and unemployment duration (UEDUR) have 
no effects. This means that the qualification period and the duration of benefit have no 
effect on unemployment. We expected the former to reduce the rate of unemployment, 
while the latter to increase it, everything else given. The unemployment waiting time 
(UEWAIT) along with unemployment (UEMPLOY) and sickness (SICKNESS) – the 
last two variables measuring the overall generosity if unemployed or sick – are statisti-
cally significant here. We expected a negative relationship between UEWAIT and un-
employment rate but a positive relationship between UEMPLOY and SIVKNESS. Par-
ticularly waiting time and sickness benefit generosity shows interesting relationships 
since the two variables, contrary to the assumptions in the model, are positive and nega-
tive, respectively. This would mean that longer waiting time increases unemployment 
rate and more generous systems in sickness lowers the unemployment level. This seems 
counter-intuitive given our hypothesis about neutrality and cost shifting. However, it 
could be interpreted as a transfer effect: those unemployed for a longer period of time 
become defined as sick or as early retired. This lowers unemployment since sickness by 
definition is not treated as unemployment. For every day of extension in the waiting 
time the unemployment rate increases with 0.29%. An increase in the unemployment 
generosity scale increases the unemployment rate with 0.20%, while the corresponding 
change in the sickness benefits reduce unemployment rate with 0.23%, ceteris paribus. 
The Scandinavian (1.8%) and West European (3.7%) countries have on the average a 
higher unemployment rate.   
 
Model 4 includes policy-, incentive- and country-related control variables. Nearly all of 
the variables show significant effects on the rate of unemployment. The coefficient of 
time trend is positive and statistically significant suggesting that on the average unem-
ployment is increasing by 0.055% every year. The rate of unemployment is a negative 
function of the share of employment in industries. For every percentage increase in in-
dustry’s employment share the unemployment is declining with 0.26%. Private business 
ownership increases the unemployment rate. An increase in investment rate as share of   17 
GDP by 1% reduces unemployment by 0.32%. An increased gross fixed capital forma-
tion also reduces unemployment rate. West Europeans have on the average lower un-
employment (2.1%) compared to the reference group. 
 
Finally, Model 5 (full model) includes all our categories. The full model does not indi-
cate that direct government involvement has any statistically significant effect on un-
employment. Introduction of minimum wages, however, results in a 1.4% increase in 
unemployment. Consequently, in some instances non-neutrality in the form of Govern-
ment involvement in the labor market and in the wage bargaining process increases un-
employment and thus hampers economic efficiency. 
 
Furthermore, non-neutrality in the form of Constrained bargaining range – here meas-
ured as the degree of employment protection – displays a similar effect. It increases 
unemployment with 1.9%. Thus, the extent to which the labor market’s parties can 
freely negotiate and come to agreement without state involvement in this regard has a 
clear effect on the unemployment level.  
 
The last category of non-neutrality, finally, Cost shifting shows in the full model a num-
ber some interesting effects. Some variables now become significant and/or received 
reversed signs. Now unemployment qualification, the time needed to qualify for benefit, 
becomes statistically significant. This means that longer qualifying waiting periods, the 
lower the unemployment. Unemployment duration and waiting time do not show any 
effects on unemployment, but unemployment and sickness benefits have unexpectedly 
each a negative effect on unemployment. Unemployment benefit has much stronger 
effect than sickness benefit. The unemployment and sickness benefit indicators clearly 
shows that more generous systems, where the degree of non-neutrality in the form of 
cost shifting is high – indicating that key direct or indirect burden of costs for the parties 
on the labor market, or a third party, are higher – has a clear effect on unemployment. 
However, the effect is clearly negative, which means that on the average, a higher level 
of cost shifting and non-neutrality reduces unemployment, and hence improves eco-
nomic efficiency. The same caveats as mentioned above still apply however. 
   18 
The coefficient of time trend is positive and statistically significant indicating that un-
employment is increasing by 0.20% every year. The rate of unemployment is a negative 
function of the share of employment in industries and the share of private business 
ownership. For every percentage increase in these variables share the unemployment is 
declining with 0.12%. An increase in investment rate as share of GDP by 1% reduces 
unemployment by 0.3%. An increased gross fixed capital formation also reduces unem-
ployment rate. West European and Scandinavian countries have on the average 0.60% 
and 0.63% lower unemployment than the reference group of ‘Other’ countries. 
 
7. Summary and conclusions 
 
The empirical results are based on data for 18 OECD countries observed during 1970-
2003. We identify three types of non-neutrality as concerns unemployment. These in-
clude the level or degree of government involvement in the wage bargaining process 
over and above legislation which facilitate mutually beneficial wage agreements (and 
thus preventing certain outcomes in the interest of some parties), the constrained bar-
gaining range (meaning the extent to the state favors or blocks certain outcomes of the 
bargaining process), and the cost shifting (which relates to state interference shifting the 
direct or indirect burden of costs facing the parties on the labor market). Our overall 
hypothesis is that non-neutrality or non-generality increases unemployment rates.  
 
The empirical results from the general conditional model suggest that non-neutrality 
government intervention and a constrained bargaining range clearly increase unem-
ployment, while a few of the cost shifting variables have unexpected effects. The find-
ings thus give some, but not unqualified, support for the generality principle as a 
method to promote economic efficiency.  
   19 
References 
Bamber, G J & Lansbury, R D and Wailes, N (2004), International and Comparative 
Employment Relations. Globalisation and the Development of Market Economies, 
London: Sage. 
Berggren, N (2000), “Implementing Generality while Reducing the Risk for Fiscal Ex-
plosion”, Constitutional Political Economy (11): 353-369. 
Buchanan, J M (1993a) ”How Can Constitutions Be Designed So That Politicians Who 
Seek to Serve ’Public Interest’ Can Survive?”, Constitutional Political Economy 
4(1): 1-6. 
Buchanan, J M (1993b), ”The Political Efficiency of General Taxation”, National Tax 
Journal 46(4): 401-10. 
Buchanan, J M and Congleton, R D (1998), Politics by Principle, Not Interest: Towards 
Nondiscriminatory Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Buchele, R and Christiansen, J (1999), “Employment and Productivity Growth in 
Europe and North America: The Impact of Labor Market Institutions”, International 
Review of Applied Economics (13)3. 
Congelton, R D (1997) “Political Efficiency and Equal Protection of the Law”, Kyklos 
50(4): 485-505. 
FedEE, Federation of European Employers (2005), FedEE review of minimum wage 
rates. http://www.fedee.com/minwage.html 
Freyssinet, J and Seifert, H (2001), Negotiating collective agreements on employment 
and competitiveness, European foundation for the Improvement of living and Work-
ing Conditions, Dublin. 
Golden, M and J B Londregan (2006), ”Centralization of Bargaining and Wage Inequal-
ity: A Correction of Wallerstein”, American Journal of Political Science 50: 208-13. 
Golden, M and Wallerstein, M (2006), “Domestic and International Causes for the Rise 
of Pay Inequality: Post-Industrialism, Globalization and Labor Market Institutions”. 
Prepared for presentation at a meeting of the Working Group on Wealth and Power 
in the Post-Industrial Age, Yale University. 
Hayek, F A (1945), “The Use of Knowledge in Society”. The American Economic Re-
view 35: 21-30. 
Hayek, F A (1978), “Competition as a Discovery Procedure”, in Nishiyami, C and 
Leube, K (eds.) The Essence of Hayek. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press. 
Hayek, F A (1980), “1980s Unemployment and the Unions. Distortion of Relative 
Prices by Monopily in the Labour Market”, Hobart Paper 87.  London: The Institute 
for Economic Affairs. 
Huber, E, Ragin, C, Stephens, J D, Brady, D, and Beckfield, J (2004) “Comparative 
Welfare States Data Set”, Northwestern University, University of North Carolina, 
Duke University and Indiana University, 2004. 
Kaufman, B E and Hotchkiss, J L (2002) The Economics of Labour Markets, (6th ed). 
South-Western College Pub. 
Moller, S, Huber E, Stephens J D, Bradley D, Nielsen, F (2003), “Determinants of Rela-
tive Poverty in Advanced Capitalist Democracies”, American Sociological Review, 
68(1): 22-51.  
Nickell, S, Nunziata L, Ochel, W, and Quintini, G (2001) “The Beveridge Curve, Un-
employment and Wages in the OECD from the 1960s to the 1990s”, Preliminary 
Version CEP Discussion Papers 0502, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.    20 
Nickell, S and Nunziata, L (2001), “Labour Market Institutions Database”. March 29, 
2001. 
Nickell, S, Nunziata, L, and Ochel, W (2005), “Unemployment in the OECD since the 
1960s. What do we know?”, The Economic Journal, 115. 
Nycander, Svante (2000), ”Statens neutralitet på arbetsmarknaden”, in Människan i his-
torien och samtiden. Festskrift till Alf W. Johansson. Stockholm: Hjalmarson & 
Högberg.  
Nycander, Svante (2002), Makten över arbetsmarknaden: Ett perspektiv på Sveriges 
1900-tal. Stockholm: SNS. 
OECD (2004) OECD Employment Outlook, OECD, Paris 
Scruggs L and Allan J (2006) “Welfare-state decommodification in 18 OECD countries: 
a replication and revision”, Journal of European Social Policy 16(1): 55-72. 
Scruggs, L and Allan, J (2004), “Political Partisanship and Welfare State Reform in 
Advanced Industrial Societies”, American Journal of Political Science, 48(3): 496-
512. 
Scruggs, L (2005), “Welfare State Entitlements: A Comparative Institutional Analysis 
of Eighteen Welfare States.” Version 1.1 (replaces 1.0b). June 1, 2005    
Slomp, H (1998), Between Bargaining and Politics. An Introduction to European Labor 
Relations, Westport: Praeger. 
Swedish Government, Regeringens proposition, 1999/2000:32. 
Trachtenberg, Z (2001) “Generality, Efficiency, and Neutrality: Must Laws Be General 
to Be Legitimate?” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 82: 26-50. 
Van Stel, A (2000), “Compendia 2000.2: A harmonized data set of business ownership 
rates in 23 OECD countries”, Research Report H200302. SCALES. 
Wallerstein, M, Golden, M and Lange, P (1997), “Employers’ Associations, and Wage-
Setting Institutions in Northern and Central Europe, 1950-1992”, Industrial and La-
bor Relations Review 50(3).  
   21 
Appendix 1. Variables and sources 
Code  Variable  Explanation  Source 
GOVIN  government involv index       Index of government involvement in wage-setting. Cod-
ing as follows: 
1.  Govt uninvolved in wage setting 
2.  Govt establishes minimum wage(s) 
3.  Govt extends collective agreements 
4.  Govt provides economic forecasts to bargain-
ing partners 
5.  Govt recommends wage guidelines or norms 
6.  Govt and unions negotiate wage guidelines 
7.  Govt imposes wage controls in selected indus-
tries 
8.  Govt imposes cost of living adjustment 
9.  Formal tripartite agreement for national wage 
schedule without sanctions 
10.  Formal tripartite agreement for national wage 
schedule with sanctions 
11.  Govt arbitrator imposes wage schedules with-
out sanctions on unions 
12.  Govt arbitrator imposes wage national wage 
schedule with sanctions 
13.  Govt imposes national wage schedule with 
sanctions 
14.  Formal tripartite agreement for national wage 
schedule with supplementary local bargaining 
prohibited 
15.  Govt imposes wage freeze and prohibits sup-
plementary local bargaining 
 
Golden et al. 
MWLAW  min wage law=1                Minimum wage law = 1; 0 if otherwise. 
 
Nickell and Nunziata 
 
EP  Employment protection             Captures the strictness of employment protection laws. 0 
low, 2 high. 
 
--,-- 
UEQUAL  unempl qualif condition       Number of weeks of insurance needed to qualify for 
benefit. Where ambiguous, the qualifying condition 
consistent with the coding for replacement rate and 
duration of benefit has been used. 
 
Scruggs 
UEDUR  unempl benefit duration       Number of weeks of benefit entitlement. This excludes 
periods of means-tested assistance. When this varies, it 
has been assumed that the worker is aged 40 years and 
has paid insurance for 20 years. 
 
--,-- 
UEWAIT  unempl benefit waiting        Number of days one must wait to start receiving benefit 
after becoming unemployed. 
 
--,-- 
UEMPLOY  Unemployment generosity            Overall generosity score 
 
--,-- 
SICKNESS  Sickness generosity              Overall generosity score 
 
--,-- 
T  Trend  Trend/time   
INDUST  Labor force in industry (%)    Huber et al. 
TOTRATE  Total Bus Own rate             Total Business ownership rate/labor force  Van Stel 
KI  investment % of RGDPL           Huber et al. 
GROSSK  gross fixed capital              --,-- 
SCAND  Scandinavia  Binary   
WESTE  Western Europe  Binary    
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